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Facebook and MySpace in the Courtroom:
Authentication of Social Networking Websites

“As social media, or whatever you want to label it, becomes more prevalent,
there will be blunders. We’re in experimental mode right now.”2
“[T]he inability to get evidence admitted because of a failure to authenticate it almost always
is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful advance preparation.”3
I. Introduction

P

eople reveal their lives online. Since 2005,4 an
entire generation has been archiving its daily, or even
hourly, activities for hundreds of followers on social
networking websites.5 Since then, users have continued
to multiply, reaching people of all age groups.6 These sites7
are “sophisticated tools of communication where the user
voluntarily provides information that the user wants to share
with others.”8 Many of these
sites, including Facebook—the
“behemoth of the social networking world”9—and MySpace,
enable members “to create online ‘profiles,’ which are individual web pages on which
members post photographs,
videos, and information about
their lives and interests.”10
Users connect by linking
their profiles—becoming
“friends”— joining similar fan
pages, similar networks, “liking”
similar things, and sharing
content among their accounts.11
Although social networking websites have been hugely
popular for some time, they are only beginning to find their place
in the courtroom.12 Over the past few years, there has been “an
ever increasing number of cases involving social networking
communications, and these cases cover a broad range of areas of
law.”13 Indeed, social networking websites come up at various
stages of litigation, ranging from civil and criminal discovery,14 to
problems with juries,15 to use as evidence at trial,16 to sentencing
proceedings17 and beyond.
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Although there are problems associated with the use
of social networking websites at each of the aforementioned
stages, this article focuses on the use of social networking
websites as evidence at trial and the problems of authentication,
particularly in criminal cases. The article will proceed in three
parts. In Part II, this article will address the law of authentication in general, to provide a background for courts’ approaches
to authenticating social networking websites. In Part III, this
article will describe the different methodologies courts use to
authenticate different aspects of
social networking websites and
will compare those approaches
to existing case law about
authenticating electronically
stored information generally.
It will begin by examining
authentication of messages sent
via social networking websites,
and then it will analyze postings, photographs, and “tags.”
Finally, in Part IV, this article
will conclude with a summary
of the approaches, accompanied
by some recommendations and
strategies for courts and parties
for authenticating this growing category of potential evidence.
In addressing the issues that arise with the authentication
of information from social networking websites, most courts
begin by looking at the general framework for authentication,
focusing on electronically stored information in particular.18
Some courts feel comfortable applying the existing authentication rules to social networking evidence,19 while others seem
hesitant about the reliability of such evidence, and as a result,
heighten existing authentication requirements.20
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A. Law of Authentication in General
The Federal Rules of Evidence direct trial courts to apply
a sufficiency standard to determine whether a document is
authentic: the proponent of the evidence must produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the writing is what the proponent claims it to be.21 There only needs to be a prima facie
showing of authenticity to the court to demonstrate that a reasonable juror could find the document to be authentic.22 “Once
a prima facie case is made, the evidence goes to the jury, and
it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of
the evidence instead of the court.”23 Authentication is simply an
aspect of relevancy.24 The proponent’s assertion that the writing
is relevant determines what he claims the writing to be.25
Appellate courts give substantial deference to that determination, reviewing a lower court’s decision only for an abuse
of discretion, in which the determination is not to be disturbed
absent a showing that there is no competent evidence in the record
to support the decision.26 According to Federal Rule of Evidence
901(a), documents must be properly authenticated “by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims” as a condition precedent to admissibility.27
If the document is found admissible, it may be relevant. Most
state evidence codes echo the wording of Federal Rule 901.28
The traditional justification for authentication requirements is to prevent fraud or mistake.29 For example, consider
a set of documents purported to be a series of threatening letters
signed by the defendant in a criminal case. The requirement to
authenticate—or prove—that the letters were actually signed by the
defendant protects him from the possibility that a third party forged
the letter to have the defendant arrested or imprisoned for stalking.
Authentication also protects that same defendant from the risk that
the letter may have been signed by another person with the same
name. Beyond the need to prevent mistake and fraud, authentication also serves to provide context to the jury, without which, any
given document may be confusing or misleading.30
On the other hand, critics of the authentication requirement complain that it demands “proof of what may correctly
be assumed true in 99 out of 100 cases,” and makes the process
“at best time-consuming and expensive[ ]” and at “worst . . .
indefensible.”31
There are many different ways to authenticate evidence,
based both on the nature of the document and the purpose of
its use.32 In fact, the Federal Rules allow for authentication
methods not explicitly considered in the Rules themselves.
For example, although Rule 901 provides some examples and
illustrations for ways to authenticate some types of documents,
it also explicitly states that the list is not exhaustive.33 Rather,
Rule 901 was purposefully drafted to provide flexibility and
allow for the authentication of forms of evidence that the drafters
could not have anticipated.34

10

In order to authenticate a document, the proponent of the
evidence must first establish what type of document the proffered evidence purports to be.35 This, however, is generally
obvious from the document itself and requires no more than a
witness’ clarification, for example that the document is a letter,36
a ledger,37 or a photograph.38 The document’s role, and its
admissibility, more often hinges on other inferences about the
document.39 Examples of such inferences are: Who wrote it?;
Who sent it?; Who received it?; Was it altered? The answers to
each of these questions determine whether or not the document
is relevant.
Rule 901’s most typical method of authentication is
identifying the author of the document.40 This, of course, is
merely part of the document’s relevance.41 The easiest way to
identify the author is to have a witness with personal knowledge
authenticate the document by testifying either that he authored
it, or for automatically created electronic documents, that he is
familiar with the computer processes that created it.42 However,
such testimony is not always feasible and is never required.43
Rather, a document’s author may be identified to meet the
authentication threshold merely by “[a]ppearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,
taken in conjunction with circumstances.”44
Indeed, circumstantial evidence alone is often enough to
satisfy the low authentication bar.45 For example, the Third
Circuit found that the defendant sufficiently established himself
as the author of a letter for authentication purposes where the
letter was seized from the trash outside his house.46 The notes
were contained in the same garbage bag as other identifying
information, and they were written on the stationery of a hotel
where the defendant had stayed.47 Another example comes from
the Fourth Circuit, in which the court found that the author was
sufficiently identified for authentication purposes where the
documents were found in military headquarters with indexing
numbers unique to the organization reported to have created
the documents.48 Every other Circuit has also followed this
circumstantial authentication approach.49 It is clear that courts
are willing to infer authorship of a document for the purposes of
authentication through circumstantial evidence alone.
In addition to authorship, relevance can also be established
solely by identifying the person who received or found a document in question.50 Whether a person received a document can
be important in establishing that person’s knowledge of or
reaction to the information contained therein, or the fact that
he was in communication with a given person.51 Inferring that
a person received a document can be accomplished through
direct testimony from that person, since that individual would
have personal knowledge of the communication.52 Once again,
however, such testimony is not always feasible and is never
required.53 Rather, circumstantial evidence will often suffice.54
For example, the fact that an individual showed up at the exact
Fall 2012

location and time mentioned in the document, was sufficient
to authenticate that he had received the message.55 Thus,
circumstantial evidence that an individual “must have read” the
document can be enough for authentication.56
Another inference the court must make before determining
that a document is properly authenticated, is finding that the
document has not been altered from its original state.57 This is
especially important for photographs, which, although they are
sometimes included in the category
of writings, have some distinct authentication rules in case law.58 There
are two separate issues that must be
addressed in the authentication process for photographs: first, what the
scene is that the photograph depicts;
and second, whether the photograph
is an accurate representation of that
scene.59 With respect to the first issue,
a picture may be inadmissible because
it fails to show the object, place, or
person in question, but also may be
“inadmissible, although technically
accurate, because it portrays a scene
that is materially different from a
scene that is relevant to one of the issues at trial.”60 For example,
if someone materially altered the scene itself, even if it were the
correct scene, authentication would be barred.61 A photograph
may also be inadmissible because it has been altered or distorted
and thus is “inadmissible as a technically inaccurate representation
of the scene photographed.”62
The problems associated with authenticating photographs
became even more complicated with the popularization of
digital photography.63 The rise of digital photography has also
prompted the creation of technology that alters images in subtle
ways; in many cases, these subtle alterations have not affected
the admissibility of the images.64 For example, in United States
v. Seifert, an arson case, the Eighth Circuit dealt with surveillance
videotape from a building security system.65 The surveillance
videotape was filmed at a slower than normal speed in an
extra-small, extra-dark format.66 To aid the jury in viewing
the videotape, the prosecution enhanced the videotape in three
different ways: (1) speeding up the frames to make it look like
“real time,” (2) enlarging each frame to full-screen size, and (3)
brightening the film.67 These alterations did not bar authentication because they “[did] not change the image, but assist[ed]
the jury in its observation and viewing of the image, which
[enhanced] their understanding.”68
In United States v. Beeler, the government also sought
to introduce surveillance videotape that was duplicated and
enhanced.69 Alterations just like those in Seifert were made
to the surveillance videotape.70 Likewise, in Beeler, the court

found that the edited and enhanced version of the videotape was
an “accurate, authentic, and trustworthy representation[] of the
original” and admitted the tapes.71 Thus, some digital alterations
are acceptable. One can imagine other digital processes that are
possible on computer systems, but unacceptable for purposes of
authentication, like “photoshopping”72 an object or individual
into the scene that was not there before.73 Such processes are
easy to do with digital photography.
The above, well-established, case
law regarding authentication of hardcopy documents and photographs has
become more important as a baseline
for courts to use in addressing a new
genre of documentary evidence:
information stored on computers or
on the internet. In Lorraine v. Markel
American Insurance Company, the
District Court of Maryland noted that
authentication of documents from a
computer, often called electronically
stored information, or “ESI,” may
require greater scrutiny than that
required for the authentication of hard
copy documents.74 The Lorraine court
surveyed ESI authentication cases from across the country75
and concluded that admissibility of ESI is “complicated by the
fact that ESI comes in multiple evidentiary ‘flavors,’ including
e-mail, website ESI, internet postings, digital photographs, and
computer-generated documents and data files.”76
Still, the Lorraine court found “no justification for
constructing unique rules of admissibility of electronic
communications” because “the same uncertainties exist” in
ESI as in hard copy documents.77 Those uncertainties echo the
above discussion about the inferences required to authenticate
a document: with ESI, the author may be difficult to identify
given the fact that multiple users may have access to the information, which makes it more difficult to confirm whether
the information has been sent or received by a particular
person, and advanced computer technology makes alteration
more likely.78 Moreover, most attempts to introduce ESI into
evidence are through the use of hard copy printouts of the electronic information.79 This means that the printouts themselves
must be authenticated as “accurately reflecting the content of
the online page and the image of the page on the computer at
which the printout was made.”80 Despite this added complexity,
courts have adapted a flexible and comprehensive framework
to address authenticating ESI based on the same core concepts
used for authentication in general.81 These core concepts include
identifying the author or creator, identifying the person who
received the document, and determining whether the document
is an accurate representation of a person, place, or thing.82
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B.	Authenticating Social Networking Websites
Social networking websites have many features that
parties have sought to enter into evidence at trial.83 Such
evidence includes: (1) personal messages sent via social
networking websites; (2) postings on an individual account
holder’s web pages; (3) photographs posted on an individual’s
account or web page; and (4) “tags,” in which one accountholder lists another individual’s name to indicate that that
person is in a photograph, at an event, or simply has something
to do with a comment.
Further, as is the case with the many types of documents
subject to authentication, the different parts of social networking websites each present unique problems for authentication.
Most of these problems can be addressed by using the same set
of inferences used for authentication in general. Of course, if
the person who is alleged to have sent the message, posted the
information, appeared in the photograph, or otherwise made the
statement, simply testifies to his personal knowledge that he
sent it, posted it, or was present at the scene, then the inquiry
ends there, and the exhibit—most often a hard copy print-out
of electronic information—is authenticated. 84 However, in
many circumstances, the person against whom the document is
offered will not testify or will deny creating the document.85
In such cases, the myriad types of ESI that might be introduced
and the ways to authenticate this diverse category of evidence
“underscore[] the need for counsel to be creative in identifying
methods of authenticating” the evidence.86

1. Messages
One of the many functions of social networking websites is
to provide an online forum for the communication of messages.
These websites allow users to sign into personal accounts and
send messages to other individuals who have accounts on the
same website. Like email, the messages are electronic communications sent from a given account with a clear timestamp.
Like email, the user must provide the correct password in order
to access the account and send a message. Also like email, the
user may choose to send the message to a single receiver or
to a specified group of recipients. In developing an approach
to authenticate Facebook and MySpace messages, courts have
looked to e-mail and other electronic communications as either
a model to be followed or a starting point from which to embark
on the path to authentication.87
In its survey of ESI authentication across the federal system,
the District Court of Maryland noted that “[t]he most frequent
ways to authenticate e-mail evidence are 901(b)(1) (person with
personal knowledge), 901(b)(3) (expert testimony or comparison with authenticated exemplar), [and] 901(b)(4) (distinctive
characteristics, including circumstantial evidence).”88 Indeed,
all three of these methods are used to authenticate internet
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postings in general.89 Once again, because identification of the
author basically determines whether the exhibit is relevant,
it is the most important inference in a message. Importantly,
however, when it comes to the author or sender of an e-mail,
“the sending address in an e-mail message is not conclusive”
because someone with unauthorized access to an account —or
even an authorized user acting outside the scope of the authorization he was given—could always send an e-mail in the
account owner’s name.90 The same possibility—that someone
other than the account holder could send a message without the
account holder’s authorization—is present and prevalent with
messages sent from social networking accounts.
Existing case law91 indicates that courts have generally
taken one of three approaches with respect to authenticating
messages sent on Facebook and MySpace. The first approach
likens social networking website messages to e-mail and
requires no further information to authenticate messages than
what is required for email.92 The other approaches go a step
further and require either testimony about the distinctive nature
of the messages’ content,93 the security settings of the social
networking website,94 or both.95 This article refers to these
other approaches as the corroboration approach, the security
approach, and the combined approach, respectively.

i. The E-mail Parallel Approach
The first approach requires little information to authenticate
messages sent from Facebook, MySpace, and other similar sites.
One example of this more lax approach is People v. Clevenstine,
a rape case in which an appellate court in New York found
sufficient authentication of MySpace messages based on nothing more than the fact that the messages were sent from the
defendant’s account.96 Referring back to the existing e-mail
framework, this is the equivalent of finding an e-mail’s author
sufficiently identified for authentication, solely because it was
sent from that individual’s e-mail address.
In Clevenstine, the prosecution sought to introduce
MySpace messages sent from the defendant to an alleged rape
victim.97 The defendant did not testify.98 Testimony about the
MySpace messages included the following: the defendant’s
wife found the messages on the defendant’s computer, and she
recalled the content of the communications; the police retrieved
a record of the messages from the victim’s hard drive, which
meant the messages were written from his computer; and a
MySpace legal compliance officer testified that the defendant
had created the sending account.99 The Clevenstine court found
that to be sufficient for authentication.100
The court recognized the possibility that someone else
could have accessed the defendant’s MySpace account, but held
that “the likelihood of such a scenario presented a factual issue
for the jury,” rather than a bar to authentication.101 There was
no testimony about whether the content of the messages was
Fall 2012

information only the defendant would have known, or whether
the writing style resembled his.102 Despite recognizing the
potential risk that the defendant had not written the messages
in question, the court found them sufficiently authenticated for
admission into evidence.103 Thus, the Clevenstine approach
deemed messages authentic despite the presence of unanswered
questions, which, as discussed below, other courts have considered
highly relevant.104

ii. The Corroboration Approach
Courts following the other two approaches require something
beyond unsubstantiated testimony that the account belongs to the
defendant and that the messages were written from the defendant’s computer.105 These two approaches can be classified as:
(1) the corroboration approach; and (2) the security approach,
which requires testimony about the security procedures in place
for the social networking website.106 The rigorous corroboration approach is similar to the process of authenticating e-mails
through circumstantial evidence; e-mails are often deemed
authenticated as to authorship by inclusion of factual details
known only to the individual to whom the message is attributed
along with some other corroborating evidence.107 Insofar as
e-mail is concerned, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and various
district courts have followed this approach.108
The simplest corroboration approach focuses only on the
content of the messages. In such cases, courts explicitly rely on
authentication practices for e-mail and draw analogies to messages sent via social networking websites.109 For example, in
Manuel v. State, a Texas court dealt with MySpace messages in
a stalking case.110 In determining whether the proffered information identified the defendant as the author, the court noted
that in Massimo v. State, e-mails were authenticated where,
inter alia, (1) a witness recognized the e-mail address as belonging to the defendant; (2) the e-mails discussed information
only the victim, defendant, and a few other people knew; and
(3) the e-mails were written in a way the defendant was known
to communicate.111
The Manuel court reviewed the content and writing style of
the many messages sent to the victim via MySpace and based
on the case law for authenticating e-mail in Massimo, concluded
that the content was distinctive enough to tie the defendant to
the message in such a way that a reasonable fact finder could
conclude that the defendant sent all of the messages.112 This was
especially true in Manuel because other evidence corroborated
information in the MySpace messages. For example, in one
message the sender discussed giving the victim a ring, and later
gave a ring to a friend to deliver to the victim.113 This corroboration requirement has existed for e-mail authentication for over a
decade.114 Courts now treat this corroboration requirement as an
established principle for e-mails; most frequently, identification
of authorship through the e-mail address must be corroborated
Criminal Law Brief

by other authenticating factors, like content, circumstances,
internal patterns, and extrinsic evidence.115
Instead of wholesale adoption of the e-mail approach, some
courts combine both the security and corroboration approaches,
resulting in the most burdensome approach to authenticating social networking messages.116 One example of a court following
this combined “security and corroboration approach” is State
v. Eleck, an assault case in which defense counsel sought to
admit messages allegedly sent by a witness from her Facebook
account to the defendant’s Facebook account.117 The witness,
who was called by the state, testified that prior to the assault the
defendant stated to her, in person, that “if anyone messes with
me tonight, I’m going to stab them.”118 On direct, she testified
that she had not spoken or communicated with the defendant either in person or on the computer since the incident.119 Defense
counsel sought to impeach the witness by showing that she had
been in touch with the defendant since the incident through
Facebook messages.120
The defendant sought to introduce purported Facebook
messages between the defendant and the witness in order
to impeach the witness, who denied having spoken with the
defendant in person or on the computer since the assault.121 To
authenticate the messages, the defendant took the stand and
reported downloading and printing the messages from his computer.122 He further identified photographs and other postings on
the account that suggested that the witness was the owner of the
account.123 The witness herself even admitted that the username
was hers and she was the true account owner, but she denied
sending the messages.124 She testified that someone hacked into
her account and changed her password, so she no longer had
access to the account.125 Specifically, she asserted that the
account was hacked two weeks before her testimony—not at
the time the messages were sent.126
Although this situation appears to be a traditional credibility dispute, which would present a question for the jury
under the sufficiency standard discussed above, the trial court
did not treat it that way. Instead, the trial court excluded the
messages, and the appellate court affirmed, finding insufficient
information to authenticate that the witness wrote the Facebook
messages.127 The court found that the parties established that the
messages came from the witness’ account, but not that she had,
in fact, written and sent them.128 Thus the court concluded that
the messages were inadmissible.129
The Eleck court noted that while the traditional rules of
evidence likely provided a sufficient framework for authenticating such messages, there needed to be some sort of circumstantial
evidence to establish that the named sender was the actual
author.130 In fact, the court gave several examples of the type
of corroborating information that could have been used to
authenticate the sender of the messages.131 One example was
showing that the content on the sender’s account established the
13

author’s identity.132 Another was showing that the information
included in the messages was known solely to the alleged
sender.133 That information, the court noted, must be “distinctive
of the purported author and . . . corroborated by other events
or with forensic computer evidence.”134 The court found that
the messages’ mere suggestion of acrimonious history between
the witness and the defendant was not sufficiently distinctive to
establish the defendant as a sender because other people could
have known about it.135 In other words, these messages did not
pass muster under the corroboration approach.
The court also suggested
searching the computer’s
internet history,136 presumably referring to IP address137
information, to show that the
user signed on from that computer.138 Although the court
recognized that the possibility that the witness’ account
had been hacked was “dubious”—especially given that
the messages were sent prior to
the alleged hacking—the court
still found that there was insufficient foundation that she had
authored and sent the messages
herself.139 In short, the court
found that the messages were
not authenticated under the
security approach, either.140
The Eleck court set a
higher bar for the authentication of messages sent from
social networking websites
than did the Clevenstine
court in New York.141 Eleck specifically mentioned that social
networking websites suffer from a “general lack of security”
which “raises an issue as to whether a third party may have
sent the messages.”142 Perhaps in addition to meeting the low
sufficiency standard for relevance under Rule 401 and the
slightly higher sufficiency standard for authentication under
Rule 901, the Eleck court—without explicitly saying so—
imported concerns normally dealt with under Rule 403, which
include “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”143 Absent this implicit move, it is
difficult to understand why the Eleck court did not simply
mirror the requirements of e-mail authentication.

iii. The Security Approach
Among the requirements the Eleck court demanded to meet
its heightened standard was testimony about the security procedures in place for social networking websites.144 This court was
not the first to do so. In fact, other courts have not just suggested
this approach in dicta, but have actually used it.145
The Eleck court relied on a recent Massachusetts case in
which a court held that proof that a MySpace message came
from a particular account, without further authenticating
evidence that a particular
person actually wrote it,
was inadequate proof of
authorship.146 In that case,
Commonwealth v. Williams,
the prosecutor entered into
evidence MySpace messages
sent from the defendant’s
brother’s account, and the
defendant unsuccessfully
moved to strike the messages.147 The appellate court
found that the messages were
not authenticated because
there was insufficient information identifying the sender.148
As the Eleck court later
echoed, Williams highlighted
the need for information
about the website’s privacy
and security measures–“[a]
though it appears that the
sender of the messages was
using [defendant’s brother’s]
MySpace Web ‘page,’ there is
no testimony . . . regarding how secure such a Web page is, who
can access a MySpace Web page, whether codes are needed for
such access, etc.”149
Therefore, the security approach represents a big leap
forward from the traditional authentication process, requiring
information about security procedures, customarily absent from
authentication of e-mails.
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iv. Summary and Recommendations
Based on the above cases, there appears to be three
different approaches to authenticating messages sent from
social networking websites. The first, which is the lowest
hurdle, requires information showing that the messages were
sent from the user’s account. This approach considers the
risk that a third party hacked into the account as going to the
evidence’s weight and not its admissibility. The next two
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approaches require something beyond proof that the messages
were sent from a given account to establish authorship. The
corroboration approach follows the courts’ procedure for e-mail
authentication, looking to the distinctive nature of the content
or other corroborating information to show authorship. The
security approach goes beyond the established approach to
e-mail, calling for proof regarding the social networking websites’ privacy and security settings. The combined corroboration
and security approach requires both.
Although there is little case law addressing this issue to
date, there is some indication that the approach to authentication varies depending on how vital the piece of evidence is to
the case and on how severe the charges are.150 Where the case
truly hinges on a certain message, more details are required
to establish authorship. For example, in Clevenstine, the rape
case, the messages from the defendant to the victims were of
secondary importance, given that the victims’ testimony about
the rape itself was more integral to the case.151 Accordingly, the
court deemed the messages authenticated despite the recognized
risk that the defendant may not have sent them.152 By contrast,
in Eleck, the assault case, the message went to the defendant’s
intent to harm, which was key evidence; accordingly, that court
required extra evidence to establish authorship.153
Courts have yet to explain the underlying justification for
raising the bar for authentication when it comes to messages
sent from social networking websites rather than from e-mail
accounts.154 There is no reason for the heightened requirement
of discussing the websites’ security settings. The security
settings are similar—both are password-protected; to access
the account, an individual must enter an accurate username and
password. The expectations of user privacy are also similar in
that both are private messages from one sender to a particular
receiver that are not publicly displayed. With respect to the
concern about hackers, both an e-mail account and a social
networking account can be hacked into—no court has offered
information about why it would be more likely to occur in the
social networking context.155 To that end, parties seeking to
admit such messages should explain to the court that there is
no real difference between sending a message from a social
networking website versus an e-mail account. Parties seeking
to admit this type of evidence should remind the court that the
messages are, in purpose and in effect, no different from e-mail,
which is routinely authenticated and admitted into evidence.156
In contrast, parties seeking to exclude messages from social
networking websites should rely heavily on Eleck’s corroboration and security approaches.157 It would be useful to call an
expert witness prepared to discuss the fallibility of Facebook
and MySpace password protection, impressing on courts the
ease with which third parties can hack into a user’s account.158
Beyond infiltrating another user’s account, parties seeking
to exclude this evidence should also explain to the court the
Criminal Law Brief

all-too-common practice of creating fake accounts on social
networking websites, in which people create accounts in other
people’s names.159
To counter such an approach, the proponent of the evidence
must come to court with his own witness familiar with the
security settings.160 This, however, could mean that the securitydriven approach may lead to a battle-of-the-experts, which
would be an undesirable outcome on two fronts. First, a battleof-the-experts could risk losing the jury’s attention, adding
needless time to each trial, and decreasing the jury’s comprehension. Second, it could decrease the perceived fairness of the
proceedings, particularly for indigent criminal defendants, who
most likely will not be able to afford to hire this type of expert.
Although Eleck used the corroboration approach, the opinion
called for security testimony as well.161 Perhaps in recognition
of the undesirability of this outcome and the questionable need
to distinguish these messages from e-mail, the Connecticut
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the limited issue
of authentication of the Facebook messages.162
In sum, the various approaches to authentication of
messages sent from social networking websites have the potential to lead to quite different trial records and outcomes. These
messages appear to be, for all intents and purposes, nearly identical to e-mail messages. Some courts resist the comparison and
require a higher threshold of evidence to authenticate, but they
do so without providing a meaningful distinction between the
two types of messages. Whether or not the Eleck approach will
remain good law in Connecticut will, perhaps, determine the
trend in jurisdictions across the country.

2. Postings
In contrast to messages sent on social networking websites,
wall postings on these same websites are quite different from
e-mail. In addressing authentication of wall postings, courts
tend not to analogize to e-mail at all, but rather to postings on
other public forums on the web.163
Internet postings constitute a complex category that
includes “data posted by the site owner, data posted by
others with consent of the site owner, and data posted by others
without consent, such as ‘hackers.”164 Reactions to internet postings in court have ranged from “famous skepticism” to a “more
permissive approach[.]”165 When it comes to postings on social
networking sites, there are even more subdivisions to add: data
posted on one’s own wall by the account owner, data posted
on the account owner’s wall by other users, and data posted in
various groups or forums by an account user.
The “wall” or “page” generally refers to a public space on
an individual’s account homepage, or “profile page,” where
information can be posted for viewing. The account user determines which people can view the information posted on his
wall. The user can allow universal access to the information,
15

or he can limit access to defined groups: people in the same
regional network, people from the same school, people he is
“friends” with on the website, and individuals with whom the
user has acknowledged a relationship. Given the various privacy
settings, “Facebook wall postings and the MySpace comments
are not strictly ‘public,’ but are accessible only to those users
[the account holder] selects.”166 In practice, such postings can
“be viewed by anyone with access to the user’s profile page.”167
Moreover, “[a]lthough a social networking site generally
requires a unique username and password for the user to both
establish a profile and access it, posting on the site by those that
befriend the user does not.”168
As with messages, the principal inference concerning
the authentication of wall posts is who wrote the post—was
it really the account holder to whom the post is attributed, or
did someone else write it?169 Because of its novelty, courts
have had little opportunity to address this issue. However, the
issue has reached one state supreme court, which highlights its
importance.170
In Griffin v. State, a murder case, the Maryland Supreme
Court dealt with authenticating posts on the MySpace profile
page allegedly belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend, witness
Jessica Barber.171 The trial court admitted hard copy printouts
of her alleged profile page.172 The prosecution sought to use
posts on her profile page to demonstrate that Ms. Barber had
threatened another State witness in an apparent attempt to
prevent that witness from testifying against the defendant. 173
The post contained some identifying information that connected
the page to Ms. Barber, including her birthday, gender, and
hometown.174 Notably, the page also contained a threatening
post: “FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET
STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”175
When she took the stand, Ms. Barber was not questioned
about the pages allegedly printed from her MySpace profile.176
Instead, the State sought to authenticate the profile posting
solely through the testimony of the lead investigator in the
case, Sergeant John Cook.177 In lieu of his testimony, the parties
entered a stipulation that the investigator logged onto MySpace
and found the profile page with a photograph that resembled
Ms. Barber along with the identifying information listed above,
which is why he believed it to be her account.178 The parties
further stipulated that the statement in question was posted on
that profile page.179 The court concluded that this stipulated
information established that the profile page belonged to Ms.
Barber, but did not address whether she actually had authored
the threatening post.180 This is because the court was concerned
that, despite the identifying information, the profile may not
have been Ms. Barber’s at all.181
Among the issues discussed in Griffin, the court focused
on the fact that people viewing a MySpace page have no idea
whether the information is real or not. “A person observing the
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online profile of a user with whom the observer is unacquainted
has no idea whether the profile is legitimate.”182 The court’s
great concern was two-fold: first, that someone could “create
a fictitious account and masquerade under another person’s
name[;]”183 and about the potential for hackers—people who
“gain access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s username and password[.]”184 In short, “[t]he potential for fabricating
or tampering with electronically stored information on a social
networking site . . . poses significant challenges from the standpoint of authentication of printouts of the site[.]”185 Bringing
it back to the facts at hand, this means that while the content
posted on the page was certainly a threat, it may not have
been real—someone could have faked the entire profile, and,
accordingly, faked the threat. Acknowledging its unfamiliarity
with social networking websites, as in the messaging cases,
the Griffin court turned to authentication of other types of ESI
for guidance.186 But, given the concerns mentioned above, the
Griffin court concluded that from a policy perspective, postings require “greater scrutiny [than typical ESI] because of the
heightened possibility for manipulation by other than the true
user or poster.”187
In Griffin, the court concluded that there are two stages at
which authentication of authorship is required for wall postings:
first, the proponent of the evidence must show that the alleged
account holder—here, Ms. Barber—is really the person who
created the account; and second, the proponent must show
that the account holder is also the author of the post in question.188 As in Eleck, the Griffin court suggested various ways to
authenticate postings on social networking websites: (1) having
the author admit to writing the post in question; (2) searching
the author’s computer to examine whether the website was
accessed from that computer; or (3) getting information from
the social networking website linking the profile and the post
to the alleged author.189 Some sort of “extrinsic evidence” is
needed.190 However, even those methods do not foreclose the
possibility that another person accessed the witness’ account
and computer.
In Griffin, the lower court found that the officer’s testimony about the photograph, the correct birth date listed on the
profile page, as well as the rest of its content, sufficiently linked
the page to Ms. Barber.191 Ultimately, the Maryland Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court and found that the pages were
not properly authenticated and should not have been admitted
into evidence.192 No petition for review has been filed with the
Supreme Court to date, despite the dissent’s characterization of
the majority’s treatment of Facebook postings as “technological
heebie jeebies[.]”193
The two dissenting judges in the Griffin appeal case found
that the identifying information in the messages considered by
the majority was actually sufficient for a reasonable juror to
conclude that the information was authored by Ms. Barber.194
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[P]eople may write wall postings that simply do not reflect their
thoughts, feelings, or behaviors in the world beyond the web.
Accordingly, it would behoove parties seeking to exclude such
information to explain to the courts that even if authorship were
established, the information is still not relevant because it is not an
accurate reflection of any person’s true state of mind or intent.
With respect to the majority’s fear that hackers, rather than
the account holder, authored the messages, the dissent did not
consider that fear in the abstract, but rather looked at the record,
which they found “suggest[ed] no motive” for anyone to do
so.195 According to the dissent, any lingering threat that a hacker
had authored the messages should go to weight, not admissibility, and should be dealt with through cross-examination.196
Thus, the Griffin dissenters’ approach added no extra burden
and more closely paralleled typical e-mail authentication.
Nevertheless, the Griffin majority’s more burdensome standard
remains good law.
Beyond Griffin, in which a witness allegedly posted
information on her own profile page, lies a situation yet to be
considered by any court. In this scenario, a social networking
website user posts information on another individual’s profile
page or wall. Here, the danger of hackers posting information
while the user remains unaware is much higher. In the Griffin
context, if a hacker posted information on the user’s own profile
page, it is reasonable to conclude that the user would eventually come across that information. After all, the information is
posted on his own account. By contrast, if a hacker logs in to
a user’s account and posts on a different individual’s wall, the
user may never learn of the post.
To demonstrate this problem, consider a variation of the
facts in Griffin. Assume, for the sake of illustration, that the
account in question in fact belongs to Ms. Barber. Now, assume
the account is hacked. Instead of posting a threat to the prosecution’s witness on Ms. Barber’s own profile page, the hacker
logs into Ms. Barber’s account, clicks to view the other witness’
profile, then posts the threat on that witness’ profile page. Ms.
Barber may never learn that the hacker authored such a post on
the other person’s page, unless she logs into her own account
and decides to view that person’s profile page herself. No court
has dealt with this issue yet, but it presumably adds yet another
step to the authentication process for postings.
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As in messaging, then, the possibility of hackers is a hurdle
that potentially blocks authentication of wall postings.197 This
hurdle is even more apt for wall posting because the account
holder may never learn of information posted on someone else’s
wall from his own account; until recently, unlike messages there
was no “outbox” that kept a record of outgoing posts the way
there was for outgoing messages. Therefore, the risk of hackers has been treated as preempting a finding of facts sufficient
for authentication even when the posting is on the purported
author’s own “wall.” In Griffin, that risk was allocated to the
proponent of the posting, and the court put the onus on the
proponent to somehow reduce the risk in order to satisfy the
sufficiency standard.198
Moreover, in the situations described above—information
posted on one’s own profile or on another user’s wall or page—
another real problem is the content of the information posted.
Even if authorship is established, the relevance of the post may
be questionable.199 At least in Griffin, the post was offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the post.200 The court
was attempting to use that post to show that she had threatened
another witness.201 This indicates that courts are treating assertions on social networking sites as true statements. Research
outside of the legal field suggests that this is not exactly a
reliable approach, because “[b]eing able to communicate in a
faceless manner [through social networking websites] from the
comfort of one’s own living room tends to make people bolder
than they are in real life.”202 This means that people may write
wall postings that simply do not reflect their thoughts, feelings,
or behaviors in the world beyond the web.203 Accordingly, it
would behoove parties seeking to exclude such information to
explain to the courts that even if authorship were established,
the information is still not relevant because it is not an accurate
reflection of any person’s true state of mind or intent. Still, “the
standard of authentication is relatively low,” so the evidence
may come in despite such warnings.204
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Of course, the above discussion is simply a prediction,
since only the Griffin court has addressed this issue. Whether
other jurisdictions decide to follow the Griffin court’s lead, or
the self-proclaimed more technologically savvy dissent, whose
approach parallels e-mail authentication, will shape the litigation practice regarding postings on social networking sites.

3. Photographs
In addition to providing a forum for communication of
messages and public posting of information, social networking
websites also serve as online, shareable photo albums. First,
each individual user can post a “profile picture,” which is shown
on the user’s profile page. When the user posts on other profiles,
groups, or sends a message, his chosen profile picture appears
alongside the message. Users can change their profile pictures
whenever they want, and old profile pictures are gathered in
a lasting album on the user’s page. Beyond profile pictures,
social networking websites allow users to upload photographs
to create albums to share with others. There is no limit to the
number of photographs that users may upload and share. On
every photograph, the user has an option to create a caption.
Other users given permission to view the album can also post
comments to each photograph or to the album as a whole.
Some social networking websites, like Facebook, have
a feature that allows users to “tag” their friends in pictures.
Essentially, a tag is a way to identify who is in the picture. If
a user’s account is tagged in a picture, he will receive notice.
However, there is no photo-recognition technology that notifies
a user whenever a photo of him has been shared on Facebook.
Moreover, if the person has tagged another user improperly—
using the wrong spelling, for example—the user will not be
notified that the photograph has been posted.
There is no feature on social networking websites that
monitors the content of the photograph and there is no way to
determine if whatever caption posted to the photograph is accurate. Further, there are only minimal tools available for alerting
the websites to inappropriate or inaccurate photographs. For
example, on Facebook the user has an option to “report” a
photo to the website administration. The user is limited to two
categories for reporting a photograph: that the photograph is a
picture of the user and the user either does not like the photo or
finds it to be harassing; or that the photograph is not of the user,
but rather is “spam or scam, nudity or pornography, graphic
violence, hate speech or symbol, illegal drug use, [or] my
friend’s account might be compromised or hacked.”205 There is
no option available to report that the photograph is inaccurate
or altered.
At least two courts have addressed the use at trial of
photographs uploaded onto social networking websites and later
printed out as hard copies.206 Both have referred to methods
of authenticating photographs in general.207 Photographs are
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usually authenticated “by a witness with personal knowledge
of the scene depicted who can testify that the photo fairly and
accurately describes [the scene].”208
As described above, authenticating photographs became
more complex with the advent of digital photography. As one
court explained it, digital photographs “present unique authentication problems because they are a form of electronically
produced evidence that may be manipulated and altered.”209
Once digital photographs are uploaded to computers, even
with the simplest of programs like Photoshop, concerns exist
about people “removing, inserting, or highlighting” particular
aspects of the photograph.210 For that reason, two inferential
leaps are required to authenticate a digital photograph from a
social networking website: beyond determining that the scene
depicts what the party says it depicts, the court must also find
that a reasonable juror could conclude that the photograph has
not been altered in any impermissible way.211
In People v. Beckley, a murder case, the prosecution sought
to admit photographs posted on the defendant’s MySpace
page.212 At issue in the case was whether the defendant was
a gang member and whether the shooting was part of gang retaliation.213 The pictures showed one of the defense witnesses flashing
gang signs.214 The prosecution sought to use the pictures to impeach
the witness by rebutting her testimony that she did not associate
with gang members.215 The defense conceded that the face in
the photograph was in fact a picture of the witness, but still
challenged its authenticity.216
As a first step, the Beckley court looked to case law about
authenticating photographs in general, and noted that, like messages and other postings from social networking websites, a
photograph is a writing and likewise requires authentication.217
Beyond the general premise that photographs must be authenticated, the Beckley court also highlighted “the untrustworthiness of images downloaded from the internet.”218 Specifically,
the court noted that anyone can post a photograph online, that
photographs on websites are not monitored for accuracy, that
images are not posted under oath, and that hackers can easily
adulterate images posted to the web.219
Mirroring the need for expert testimony in the context of
messages, the Beckley court explained that testimony from a
photographic expert that the photograph was not a composite
and had not been faked is “critical,” and could have authenticated the photograph in question.220 The need for expert testimony
for photographic social networking evidence brings up fairness concerns for criminal defendants, echoing the concerns
discussed above in the messaging context. It is unlikely that
many criminal defendants can afford the fees required to have
such expert testimony in court.221 Because no such expert testified in Beckley, the court concluded that the photographs were
not properly authenticated and should have been excluded.222
But, the court found that their admission was merely harmless
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error.223 The Beckley court’s approach is on par with existing
approaches to authenticating digital photographs in general:
that the photograph happened to be posted on MySpace did not
trigger any additional requirements for authentication.
People v. Lenihan, a murder case in New York, went
further than Beckley, suggesting that not even expert testimony
could solve the authentication problem for photographs found
on social networking websites.224 In Lenihan the defendant
sought to use photographs printed from MySpace to crossexamine witnesses about their alleged gang ties.225 Besides the
photographs, there was no other evidence of the witnesses’ gang
membership that could be used to justify the questions on crossexamination.226 The defendant’s mother found photographs on
MySpace that allegedly depicted the state’s witnesses making
hand gestures and wearing clothing that suggested an affiliation
with a certain gang.227 Like Beckley, the Lenihan court determined that the photographs could not be properly authenticated
“[i]n light of the ability to ‘photo shop,’ [or] edit photographs
on the computer[.]”228 In fact, the court was so convinced that
there was no way to authenticate the photographs that it completely barred the defendant from cross-examining the state’s
witnesses about their gang affiliation and confronting them
with the photographs.229 The Lenihan court was so sure that the
photographs could not be authenticated that it was willing to bet
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights
by denying the cross-examination.230
These two cases have strong implications for the evidentiary
role of photographs uploaded to social networking websites.
Despite publicized warnings about keeping questionable photographs off of the internet,231 the minimal case law here suggests
that an individual’s online images are not a problem once the
case reaches the courtroom unless (1) the witness concedes that
the photographs are authentic; or (2) an expert testifies that the
photographs have not been altered.232 Absent these two criteria,
social networking website photographs are unlikely to be used
against a witness at trial under Beckley and Lenihan.233
Still, social networking website users would be wise to
monitor photographs that do end up online, as courts may feel
more comfortable admitting such photographs as they become
more comfortable with social networking websites in general.
Further, the courts in both Beckley and Lenihan essentially
gave instructions for parties seeking to use such photographs
as evidence.234 According to Beckley, all the proponent of such
evidence must do is hire an expert in digital photography to
testify that the photograph is not a composite and that the scene
depicted in the photograph on the social networking site had
not been altered in a meaningful way.235 If the Beckley court’s
instructions hold and parties actually follow that advice, then it
will not be long before such photographs are routinely entered
into evidence.
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4. Comments, Tags, and Other Notifications
Courts have had the chance to address the evidentiary use
of messages, postings, and photographs from social networking
websites, and as described above, the law of authenticating each
of those types of evidence will likely evolve over the next few
years. In addition to adaptations in their approaches to those
three types of evidence, courts will inevitably be faced with
evidence in the form of the many other tools and features of
social networking websites. Because there is no available case
law on the rest of these features, one can only imagine how the
courts will handle attempts to use them as evidence. It is helpful
to understand the many features of social networking websites
before predicting how courts will treat them.
“Tags,” in photographs, status updates, or wall postings,
have not been addressed in court. “[P]hoto tagging is a popular
feature that allows users to identify themselves or other members of the site by name in photos. A photo tag creates a link
to that user’s profile and identifies the person and her specific
location in the photo.”236 Any user can tag another user with
whom he is friends in a photo. Although the tagged user has the
option to remove her account name—her online identity—from
the photograph, the photograph remains on the social networking site until the user who uploaded it chooses to take it down.237
The initial tagging process is unmonitored, and a user can feel
free to tag any part of a photograph as any one of his friends,
despite the possibility that the tags may be incorrect.238
The tagging process also extends beyond photographs to
postings. A relatively new feature on Facebook allows users to
tag friends in status updates and comments as well.239 Likewise,
the tag may not be valid, but the post will remain on the site
until the user who authored it decides to delete it. Further, in
addition to tagging, both Facebook and MySpace allow users
to caption or comment on photographs that they post or photographs posted by other people.
Extending courts’ logic of authenticating messages and
photographs to tagging, the problems only worsen. First, the
same susceptibility to hacking exists—in fact, if anything it is
even more prevalent with tagging. This is especially true given
that unlike messages or photographs, the user may never receive
notification that his account posted a comment or a tag on someone else’s account. Further, if the user infrequently checks his
account, he may have been tagged in countless photographs or
comments inaccurately or inappropriately. For example, imagine one user has posted a photograph onto his own Facebook
profile page. The photograph depicts a scene at night. It is dark
outside. There are several people in the photograph, but their
faces are obscured because of the darkness. Although their
faces cannot be seen, the metallic glare of guns held in each
of their hands can be seen. The user tags a criminal defendant
in the photograph. That criminal defendant does not log on to
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Facebook anymore, so he receives no notice of the tag. In his
prosecution for gang-related crimes, the government seeks to
use the photograph against the defendant to show that he had
access to a firearm. There are several possible explanations
for why the defendant was tagged in that photograph. First, of
course, he could have been in the photograph. Second, it could
have been a joke—the user could have uploaded a random photograph he found on the internet and tagged his friends in it.
Third, it could have been a mistaken tag: the user meant to tag a
different friend with a similar name, and wound up tagging the
defendant. Because of the myriad possibilities, the meaning of a
tag is even less clear than a message or a photograph.
While a tag may indicate that the tagged user is in a photograph, as above, or has participated in some activity with the
tagging user, it may also indicate that the tagging user wishes
only to get the tagged user’s
attention. The meaning of a tag
in a photograph or comment,
then, is speculative at best.
Another example illustrates
the complexity of this problem.
Imagine one user posts a photograph picturing no people, but
only guns. Another user tags
the defendant in a criminal case
in the photograph. There is no
indication that the defendant
ever received notice of the tag.
Certainly there is no way that
the tag actually indicates that the
defendant is in the photograph.
Can the state use the photograph
to indicate the defendant’s connection to firearms? There are
many necessary inferences to
authentication in this situation.
First, who tagged the defendant? The general issues of
authenticating the author of any
social networking communication apply at this level. Next,
what is the photograph intending to depict and has it been
altered? The general issues of authenticating a photograph also
apply. Finally, what, if anything, is the truth that a tag asserts?
Although it seems inevitable that parties will eventually seek to
enter such tags as evidence, it seems unlikely that courts will
jump through each of these hoops to authenticate such a tag on a
social networking website because it would take too much time
and energy for very little probative value.

Conclusion
Courts are just beginning to shape the law of authenticating
social networking websites. Various courts’ approaches are
shaped by their unfamiliarity with the websites and how they
work, which leads to hesitation to fit social networking evidence
into the framework of existing authentication procedures for
other electronically stored information. Given that hesitation,
the trend is for courts to require something beyond typical ESI
authentication procedures, including information about the
security settings of social networking websites before determining that a given piece of evidence is authentic.240
However, as courts become more familiar with social
networking websites and their use in court increases, such
additional requirements of the “sufficiency” standard may be
dropped. Indeed, those additional requirements should be
dropped—without delay—with
respect to messages sent from
social networking websites. As
described above, there is no
difference between sending an
electronic communication from
an e-mail account or a social
networking account. The purpose, function, outbox, privacy
settings, and potential for hackers are exactly the same for both
types of accounts. Concededly,
there may be a need for heightened authentication requirements when it comes to other
features of social networking
websites, including posts and
photographs and especially
tags, where the user may not
have a record of the communication and where the purpose
of the communication may not
be clear. But there is simply no need to impose any additional
requirements with messages, which lack neither records of sent
messages nor clarity of purpose. Thus, the additional requirements should be eliminated for messages as soon as possible,
but may remain for some time for other features of social networking websites.
This prediction and recommendation, especially with
respect to messages, is not to say that social networking websites
will be regularly entered into evidence at trial. Rather, authentication is only the first step for the message, posting, photograph,
or other proffered evidence from a social networking website.
Like all other types of evidence, even once ESI—including ESI
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from social networking websites—makes it past the low threshold of information required for authentication, it is still subject to
a number of other evidentiary hurdles, including hearsay,241 the
best evidence rule,242 Rule 403,243 Fourth Amendment problems
related to how the information was obtained,244 and—at least
in criminal cases when the information is being used against
the defendant—the Confrontation Clause. Again, as evidence
from social networking websites appears more frequently in
the courtroom, courts’ approaches to evidentiary issues beyond
authentication will become clear, which will affect whether
parties actually try to use this type of evidence routinely.
Finally, even when appellate courts find in criminal cases
that social networking website evidence was not sufficiently
authenticated, the convictions remain intact. This is because
courts often find that the admission of unauthenticated messages, postings, or photographs is merely harmless error.245
Reversible error has been found only when the trial record
is replete with the state’s references to and repeated reliance
on the improperly authenticated evidence throughout the trial
and especially during closing argument.246 Consequently, the
fundamental effect of varying the authentication approaches to
this type of evidence is unlikely to be a reversal of convictions
or judgments.247 However, trends in the case law will serve to
shape the case strategy of parties seeking to admit or exclude
this type of evidence. For example, if courts continue to follow
the security-driven approach to messages, parties will know
that they must bring in an expert to enter the message into
evidence.248 In contrast, if more courts follow the corroboration
approach, parties will be forced to focus more on content and
surrounding circumstances.249
So what does existing case law mean for the courts, for
parties, and for users of social networking websites? Courts
must be able to adapt to the fast-paced, ever-growing world of
the internet. Surely courts cannot reinvent the wheel and create
new tests for each different type of internet-produced piece of
evidence proffered in every case. Instead, courts must maintain
the flexibility intended by Rule 901, seeking to elicit a full
picture of the evidence in a way that maintains fairness to all
parties. Per the Griffin dissent, courts should accept this new
category of evidence without hesitation; after all, it will only
become more prevalent with time.250
Lawyers must come to court expecting a challenge, armed
with the knowledge that in all likelihood, litigation is an
opportunity to teach the court about social networking websites
in a way that benefits their clients. Indeed, most of the cases that
deemed proffered evidence inauthentic, provided parties with
explicit instructions for next time, identifying for the proponent of the evidence exactly what kind of information would
be needed to authenticate the evidence. Most frequently, that
information involves experts who can testify to the security
settings of social networking websites or digital photography
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experts who can testify to whether or not a picture has been
altered. Given such clear directions by many courts, failure to
authenticate social networking evidence in those jurisdictions is
truly an avoidable “self-inflicted injury”251—provided, of course,
that the party can afford to hire such an expert. Case law on this
issue will likely evolve over the next few years, albeit at a slower
pace than the social networking websites themselves, and advocates must stay up to date on changes in the law while applying
it by analogy to whatever new features social networking
websites create.
Finally, users of social networking sites must be aware of
how their web presences are just a click away from becoming
evidence. It would, perhaps, be too much to ask that Facebook,
MySpace, and other social networking websites provide
Miranda-like warnings or disclosure to their users, highlighting
the fact that one’s online presence can be used against them in
a court of law.252 Indeed, such a request stands in contrast to
the purpose of such websites, which foster a forum for sharing
information, not limiting it. Yet it is in the websites’ best interests to maintain long-term clients, and providing such advice
may be perceived as well-intentioned, helpful alerts. Certainly a
user would prefer a warning, in lieu of having his own Facebook
post used against him at trial.
This type of evidence will likely make its way into the
courtroom more frequently over the next few years, as the courts
become more familiar with social networking websites and
especially as a younger generation of lawyers and clients,
constant users of such sites, become parties. Indeed, social
networking evidence in the courtroom is already making
national headlines in pre-trial proceedings against George
Zimmerman, who was charged with second-degree murder of
teenager Trayvon Martin in 2012.253 Because of its publicity,
Zimmerman’s trial is likely to serve as a touchstone for the use
of this type of evidence in criminal trials. Until more jurisdictions, including the Florida county circuit court presiding over
George Zimmernan’s trial,254 address these issues head on, parties
must be prepared to meet the heightened bar that some courts have
set thus far, requiring specific information about security settings
and photography technology. While a heightened bar may well
be appropriate for posts, tags, and whatever new functions are yet
to come to social networking websites, with respect to messages
sent from such sites there is simply no need to surpass the sufficiency standard widely used for e-mail evidence today.
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§ 8 (2011).
14
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1171 (Mass.
2010) (noting the use of MySpace computer messages in a criminal
murder trial); Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010) (indicating that the defendant filed a discovery request seeking
records from the plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace accounts in a personal
injury case).
15
See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by juror’s use of
Facebook during trial); State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38, 40 (W. Va. 2010)
(reversing a conviction where a juror was “friends” with the defendant on
MySpace); see also Bob Egelko, Jurors to be told not to tweet under new
law, SFGate (Aug. 6, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/08/05/BAKM1KK4BM.DTL (discussing a new
California state law banning jurors’ use of social networking sites and other
electronic communications during trial).
16
See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568-69 (D.
Md. 2007) (stating that the prevalence of social media communications has
substantially impacted litigation and evidence collection).
17
See, e.g., United States v. Nagel, No. CR-10-511, 2011 WL 4025717,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011) (using MySpace and Facebook messages
sent to victims by the defendant as justification for imposing an aboveguidelines sentence for a defendant convicted of stalking).
18
See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 422-23 (Md. 2011) (asserting that authenticity of electronically stored information is governed by

22

the general rules of authentication, but noting the specific methods of
authentication most suitable; see also State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818,
822-23 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (identifying proper methods of authentication
for electronically stored information, including witness testimony, expert
testimony, and circumstantial facts).
19
See, e.g., People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2009) (admitting MySpace messages into evidence through traditional
authentication procedures), appeal denied, 925 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 2010).
20
See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 424 (rejecting a printout image from a social
networking page, noting the potential for abuse due to the ability of someone to manipulate another’s social networking site).
21
See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a); see also Arena v. United States, 226 F.2d 227,
234 (9th Cir. 1955) (“The question of whether the authenticity of a document
has been sufficiently proved . . . rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.”)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954 (1956).
22
See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir.
1986) (“The only requirement is that there has been substantial evidence . . . .”).
23
Id.
24
See Fed. R. Evid. 901 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (a)
(stating that authentication denotes relevancy); see also R & D Amusement
Corp. v. Christianson, 392 N.W.2d 385, 386 (N.D. 1986) (“The purpose of
authentication is to establish the document’s relevancy.”).
25
See R & D Amusement Corp., 392 N.W.2d at 386 (concluding that a
document is properly authenticated when the proponent provides evidence
sufficient to show that the document is what the proponent claims it to be).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 16 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (11th Cir.
1994) (upholding the trial court’s authentication of bank documents);
United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 331 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding
the trial court’s authentication of handwritten notes). But see United States
v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence based on its “aura of
authenticity,” and not based on federal evidence rules).
27
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (emphasis added).
28
See, e.g., Tex. Evid. R. Ann. 901(a) (West 1998) (using same language
as Rule 901); Md. Code Ann., Rule 5-901 (West 1993) (echoing the
language of FRE 901); Cal. Evid. Code § 403 (West 1965) (separating
authentication for writings and non-writings, but requiring substantially
similar information as the federal rule).
29
See McCormick on Evidence, 57-58 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006) (noting that rules of authentication are a necessary check on the
perpetration of fraud).
30
See id. at 58 (describing the jury’s need for additional contextual
background of a writing or document).
31
See id. (citing Mancari v. Frank P. Smith, Inc., 114 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir.
1940).
32
See, e.g., First State Bank of Denton v. Md. Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38, 41
(5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the illustrations provided by the federal rule are
not exclusive, all that is necessary is “sufficient authentication to make a
prima facie case that would allow the issue . . . to be decided by the jury.”).
33
See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (listing different types of evidence that can
fulfill the authentication requirement); Fin. Co. of Am. v. BankAmerica
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895, 900 (D. Md. 1980) (“Those methods [of authentication set out in Rule 901], however, are merely illustrations and not
limitations upon the manner in which documents may be authenticated.”).
34
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 901 advisory committee’s note to subdivision
(b) (“The examples are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of allowable methods but are meant to guide and suggest, leaving room for growth
and development in this area of the law.”).
35
See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 29, at 56.
36
See, e.g., Bazak Int’l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 378 F. Supp. 2d
377, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a letter was properly authenticated
based on witness testimony).
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See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authenticate a
ledger). cert. denied sub nom., Hicks v. United States, 502 U.S. 849 (1991).
38
See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 945-46 (Conn. 2004)
(concluding that witness testimony is an appropriate method to authenticate
photographs in light of ongoing technological advances).
39
See Smith, 918 F. 2d at 1510 (noting that circumstantial evidence alone
is sometimes sufficient for authentication).
40
See Fed. R. Evid. 901 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (a)
(“[A] telephone conversation may be irrelevant . . . because the speaker is
not identified.”).
41
See id. (stating that a showing of the author’s identity is one of many
factors contributing to the authenticity requirement).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App’x. 264, 264 (5th Cir.
2006) (ruling that copies of computer records could be authenticated by a
qualified witness with personal knowledge of the procedure that generated
the records); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 545 (D. Md.
2007) (concluding that the authentication requirement for electronically
stored information can be met by testimony of either the author or by an
expert with specific knowledge about how the information is created and
preserved); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 n.2 (D.D.C.
2006) (noting that e-mail may be authenticated by a witness with personal
knowledge of the e-mail’s creation).
43
See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (specifying additional types of evidence other
than witness testimony that can satisfy the authentication requirement).
44
Id. at (b)(4).
45
See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting the weight of circumstantial evidence for authentication purposes),
cert. denied sub nom. Hicks v. United States, 502 U.S. 890 (1991).
46
See, e.g.,, United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 329-331 (3d Cir.
1992) (concluding that the circumstantial evidence offered was sufficient
to link the handwritten notes to the defendant).
47
Id.
48
See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009)
(upholding the district court’s decision that the Government fulfilled its
authentication requirement of military documents through corroborative
evidence).
49
See McLain v. Newhouse, 516 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding
authentication of a ledger sheet); United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566,
575 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775 (11th Cir.
1989) “[T]he circumstantial evidence of where the documents were found
. . . was sufficient to authenticate the documents in the absence of any
evidence of adulteration or forgery.”); United States v. Demjanjuk, 367
F.3d 623, 631-32 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s authentication of a service pass based on circumstantial evidence); United States v.
Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that Rule 901 does
not “erect a particularly high hurdle,” and that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for authentication); United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 169
(1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that a photograph can be properly authenticated
by direct or circumstantial evidence, without the need for witness testimony); United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d 342, 344 (10th Cir.
1991) (authenticating a fingerprint card based on circumstantial evidence);
United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 785 (11th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446, 1452 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that the content
and appearance of a document can serve as evidence to authenticate it);
Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 586 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1978)
(concluding that direct or circumstantial evidence can authenticate a document); United States v. Sutton, 426 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(stating that authorship of a document for authentication purposes can be
shown through circumstantial evidence, such as personal information in the
document only known to the purported author).
37
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See, e.g., Bodrey v. Bodrey, 269 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. 1980) (noting that
authorship of a love letter found by the appellant’s wife was immaterial;
instead proof of relevancy was required, which was satisfied by the fact that
the wife found the letter) (emphasis added).
51
See, e.g., id. (noting that the relevance of whether appellant’s wife
found a love letter was not whether the letter was true, but to explain the
wife’s subsequent conduct).
52
See, e.g, Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (permitting testimony by a witness
with knowledge).
53
See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (noting that the illustrations, including witness
testimony, are merely examples and not a complete list of evidence that can
satisfy the authentication requirement).
54
See United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that the connection between a message and its source may be established
by circumstantial evidence); United States v. Clark, 649 F.2d 534 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holding that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish
authenticity of a document).
55
See, e.g., United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the chat room log printouts were adequately authenticated
when the defendant showed up to a meeting arranged through the chat
room).
56
See id. (upholding the authentication of a chat room log printout
because of sufficient circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the
chat room).
57
See United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 802 (10th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the court’s responsibility to decide whether “there is a
reasonable probability that the evidence has not been altered in any material
aspect since the time of the crime.”).
58
See People v. Beckley, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 366 (Ct. App. 2010)
(noting the heightened untrustworthiness of photographs as evidence due
to the ease with which they can be digitally manipulated), as modified on
denial of reh’g (June 24, 2010), review denied (Sept. 22, 2010), cert. denied
sub nom. Beckley v. California, 131 S.Ct. 1522 (2011).
59
See United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977)
(stating that a photograph may be inadmissible due to its distortion or
manipulation, or because the scene portrayed in the photograph is
irrelevant).
60
Id.
61
See id. (noting the importance of the photographs’ relevancy for
authentication purposes).
62
See id.
63
See generally United States v. Seifert, 445 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir.
2006) (upholding the district court’s decision to admit video surveillance
even though it was digitally-enhanced and therefore altered from its original state).
64
See, e.g., id. at 1045 (noting that enhancement of a surveillance tape did
not alter its imagery); see also United States v. Beeler, 62 F. Supp. 2d 136,
149 (D. Me. 1999) (noting that a witness testified to editing and enhancing
the quality of a video tape without modifying its content).
65
See Seifert, 445 F.3d at 1045 (affirming appellant’s arson conviction
based largely on incriminating surveillance video which was altered for use
at trial).
66
See id. (noting that the original surveillance video was “time lapsed”).
67
See id.
68
Id.
69
See Beeler, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (rejecting the defendant’s argument
that copies of surveillance video should be inadmissible because they have
been modified through digital enhancement).
70
See id. at 149 (noting that the images from the video were shaded for
better visibility, but not altered in their content).
71
Id. at 149-50.
50
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See United States v. Frabizio, 463 F. Supp. 2d 111, 112-13 (D. Mass.
2006) (“Photoshop and other, similar programs . . . suggest[] it may be
possible to digitally create or manipulate photographs in a manner the
naked eye cannot detect.”)
73
See, e.g., United States v. Berringer, 601 F. Supp. 2d 976, 977-79 (N.D.
Ohio 2008) (discussing the use of technology in “virtual child pornography” in which minors appear to engage in sexually explicit images but were
added into the scene using computer imaging technology).
74
See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542-43 (D.
Md. 2007) (acknowledging that higher standards for authenticity may
be required, but that it is unnecessary to completely abandon the use of
traditional evidence rules).
75
See id. at 541- 42 (examining cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh Circuits, and several district courts).
76
Id. at 538.
77
Id. at 543.
78
See Catherine Guthrie & Brittan Mitchell, The Swinton Six: The Impact
of State v. Swinton on the Authentication of Digital Image,, 36 Stetson L.
Rev. 661, 664-65 (2007) (detailing alterations available for digital images,
including reparative and visual enhancement techniques).
79
See, e.g., St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d.
773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (requiring the plaintiff to present hard copy
documentation instead of arbitrary information found on the internet to
support plaintiff’s argument).
80
McCormick on Evidence, supra note 29, at 74.
81
See id. at 72-73 (noting courts’ flexibility regarding the admissibility
of electronic technologies such as emails and web postings).
82
See id. at 72-73.
83
See, e.g., People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2009) (MySpace messages); State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2011) (Facebook and MySpace messages); Griffin v. State, 19
A.3d 415, 426 (Md. 2011) (Facebook wall posts); People v. Beckley, 110
Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 363 (Ct. App. 2010) (MySpace photograph); People v.
Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d 588, 591 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (same).
84
See Linda Listrom et. al, The Next Frontier: Admissibility of
Electronic Evidence, 1, at 9, available at http://www.mccarthyfingar.
com/files/20110129123145-A%20B%20A%20(00276545).PDF (noting
that testimony of a witness with direct knowledge about a web posting is
sufficient evidence for its authentication).
85
See, e.g., Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 513 (in rape case in which
prosecution sought to offer a MySpace message allegedly sent by the
defendant, defendant did not testify); Eleck, 23 A.3d at 821 (witness who
allegedly sent Facbeook messages testified that the account was hers but
denied writing or sending the messages at issue).
86
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 553 (D. Md. 2007).
87
See, e.g., State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)
(relating e-mails and text messages to Facebook and MySpace messages
because each of these forms of communication could be “generated by
someone other than the named sender”); see also People v. Clevenstine,
891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (noting the defendant’s
argument that someone else sent incriminating MySpace messages from
his account), appeal denied, 925 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 2010).
88
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 555.
89
See id. at 556 (specifying methods available for authenticating website
postings).
90
See id. at 554-55 (concluding that the sender address alone is not
sufficient evidence to authenticate an e-mail); Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d
at 513 (requiring witness testimony in addition to a sender address to
authenticate MySpace messages).
91
See Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 513 (the “email parallel approach”);
Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (the “corroboration approach”); Eleck, 23 A.3d at 822 (the “security approach”).
72

24

See Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (likening MySpace messages
to emails and requiring no extra information for authentication).
93
See Manuel, 357 S.W.3d at 75 (requiring corroborating evidence of
unique content to authenticate MySpace messages); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass. 2010) (requiring corroborating
evidence of authorship to authenticate MySpace messages)
94
See Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1171 (Mass. 2010) (highlighting the need
for evidence about MySpace’s security settings); State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d
818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (same).
95
See, e.g., Eleck, 23 A.3d at 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (requiring
both corroborating evidence of authorship and additional evidence about
Facebook’s security settings).
96
See Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (rejecting defendant’s argument
that someone else could have accessed his MySpace account and sent the
messages, leaving the issue for the jury).
97
See id. at 513.
98
See id.
99
See id. at 514.
100
See id.
101
Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (explaining that the defendant’s
argument went to the weight of the evidence and not to the admissibility
of the evidence).
102
See id., (rejecting the defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence
was presented to authenticate the messages).
103
See id. (finding the messages properly authenticated and noting that the
defendant’s arguments against authentication go to the evidence’s weight
rather than admissibility).
104
See id.
105
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass.
2010) (excluding the admissibility of MySpace messages sent from the
defendant’s account because insufficient proof existed to conclude that the
messages had been generated and sent by the defendant himself); see also
State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (noting the possibility that someone can access another person’s private e-mail or Facebook
account).
106
See Eleck, 23 A.3d at 822 (stating that the Facebook messages had
not been sufficiently authenticated, and required either forensic computer
evidence or corroborative facts to do so).
107
See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir.
2000) (finding e-mails to be authenticated based on the e-mail address and
factual details known only to the defendant that were corroborated by later
telephone conversations);.United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding the author of chat room messages identified for authentication purposes when the author showed up at a meeting arranged during
the chat session); see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 546 (D. Md. 2007) (noting the authentication of instant message transcripts based on witness testimony that corroborated other circumstantial
evidence).
108
See, e.g., United States v. Kassimu, 188 F. App’x. 264, 264 (5th Cir.
2006) (holding that postal records were properly authenticated based
on corroborative expert testimony); Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1322 (using the
corroboration approach in the Eleventh Circuit); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at
546 (noting that circumstantial and direct facts are needed for authentication of a document); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40
(D.D.C. 2006) (stating that identifying the sender address of an email is not
sufficient evidence to prove authorship of an email).
109
See, e.g., Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011)
(noting that text messages, instant messages, MySpace evidence, and
Facebook messages, can be authenticated by using the same factors to
authenticate e-mails based on the “‘[a]ppearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics taken in conjunction
with circumstances.’”).
92
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See id. at 69 (stating that the appellant utilized electronic communications as a method of threatening the victim).
111
See id. at 75 (citing Massimo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 210, 215-17
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) in considering an email message’s substantive and
distinctive characteristics along with the circumstances of its delivery).
112
See id. at 81.
113
See id. at 79 (noting corroborative facts that authenticated the electronic
communications sent from the defendant to his stalking victim).
114
See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir.
2000) (authenticating e-mails not only by use of the defendant’s e-mail
address, but by inclusion of factual details known only to the defendant that
were corroborated by telephone conversations); United States v. Safavian,
435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (authenticating e-mails not only by
use of the defendant’s e-mail address, but by inclusion of content known
only to the defendant, use of the defendant’s nickname, and testimony by
witnesses that the defendant spoke to them about the subjects contained in
the e-mail).
115
See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546 (D. Md.
2007) (citing to Federal Rule 901(b)(4) in reference to the “circumstantial
evidence rule” of authentication).
116
See, e.g., State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)
(noting the potential for manipulation or abuse to one’s social media
account by another and thus, requiring more than showing whose account
a message came from for authentication).
117
See id. at 820 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the lower court erred
when it barred from evidence a Facebook message sent from the victim’s
account to the defendant’s account).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See id. (stating that the victim said she only saw the defendant in public
and never exchanged any type of communications with him).
122
See id. at 820-21.
123
See Eleck, 23 A.3d at 821.
124
See id. at 820.
125
See id.
126
See id. (clarifying that the hacker had changed the password to her
account after the messages were sent from her account, suggesting that she
still had access at the time the messages were sent).
127
See id. at 821 (sustaining the lower court’s holding that the messages
were not properly authenticated because the victim’s authorship was not
sufficiently shown).
128
Eleck, 23 A.3d. at 822 (“[p]roving only that a message came from a
particular account, without further authenticating evidence, has been held
to be inadequate proof of authorship.”).
129
See id. at 821.
130
See id. at 824 (upholding the trial court’s ruling that the defendant
failed to present sufficient corroborative facts for authentication of the
Facebook messages).
131
See id. at 823 (identifying ways to corroborate telephone conversations,
letters on a computer hard drive, and electronic messaging).
132
See id. (suggesting that the proponent of the evidence investigate the
search history of the alleged author’s computer to prove authorship of an
electronic message).
133
Eleck, 23 A.3d. (noting that the purported author’s writing style or personal references can serve as corroborative evidence to prove authorship
of letters on a hard drive).
134
Id. at 824.
135
See id. at 824 (agreeing with the lower court that the subject matter of
the conversation was not peculiar enough to implicate the defendant as the
only possible sender).
110
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See id. at 823 (reasoning that in operating a computer the user
inadvertently leaves an evidential trail for someone with the knowhow to
find, providing evidence of their internet usage).
137
See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1105 n.3 (D.
Kan. 2000) (“The IP, or Internet Protocol, address is unique to a specific
computer. Only one computer would be assigned a particular IP address.”).
138
However, even showing that the account was accessed from a given
computer based on IP address information does not foreclose the possibility
that an unauthorized user logged into the witness’ computer in order to
hack the account.
139
See Eleck, 23 A.3d. at 824 (finding that the reply “the past is the
past” in response to the defendant’s inquiry regarding why the witness
was speaking to him contained no information that was specific to or only
known by the witness).
140
See id.
141
Compare Eleck, 23 A.3d. at 825 (requiring security testimony in
conjunction with corroborative evidence), with People v. Clevenstine, 891
N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (requiring only corroborative
testimony), appeal denied, 925 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 2010).
142
Eleck, 23 A.3d. at 824.
143
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
144
See Eleck, 23 A.3d. at 822 (discussing the relative ease with which
one can masquerade under another person’s name on a social networking
site by either creating a fake profile or gaining access to a person’s actual
account by cracking their username and password, or by simply gaining
access to an unattended electronic device that is still logged on to a personal
site).
145
See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424-25 (Md. 2011); see also
Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass. 2010) (requiring testimony that the defendant’s brother was the only one who could
communicate from his MySpace page).
146
See Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172 (comparing a MySpace Web page to
a telephone call, the court held that testimony from a witness claiming to
receive a message from another, without anything more, is not enough to
authenticate the message).
147
See id. at 1171. (denying defendant’s motion to strike the witness’
testimony, but refusing to admit a printout of the messages).
148
See id. at 1172 (holding that the foundational testimony did not identify
the actual sender, since no testimony was proffered as to how secure a
MySpace Web page is).
149
Id. at 1172.
150
See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 427-28 (requiring a greater degree of authenticity than what was established by the evidence provided, noting that the
particular evidence or testimony may have changed the outcome of the
case); see also State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 820-21 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)
(requiring testimony on security protocols before allowing the defendant
to impeach the state’s witness).
151
See People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513-14 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009) (upholding the defendant’s conviction and explaining that the overall
weight of the evidence, including testimony of the victims that included
specific dates and details of the sexual intercourse along with corroboration
by the defendant’s wife, overshadowed the importance of the MySpace
conversations), appeal denied, 925 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 2010).
152
See id. (holding that, in light of the facts surrounding the case, the
possibility that someone else other than the defendant sent the message was
a question of fact for the jury rather than an issue of authentication).
153
See Eleck, 23 A.3d. at 820 (requiring heightened authentication requirements, such as testimony about security protocols).
154
See, e.g., id. (establishing a higher bar for authentication of messages
from social networking websites compared to emails because of the
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